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(1) the ethical obligations of the Government 
attorney, and (2) the Government attorney’s duty 
to properly maintain information. In addition, 
although attorneys play a prominent role through-
out the Federal Government, the discussion will 
be limited to several of the most prominent laws 
affecting Executive Branch Government attorneys. 
 The first part of this BRIEFING PAPER discusses 
fundamental ethical obligations that are applicable 
to nearly all attorneys in the Executive Branch 
of Government. In particular, this part discusses 
the various statutes and regulations designed 
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torneys possess as representatives of the U.S. Government, it is not surprising that there are complex 
rules and regulations specifically designed to ensure Government attorneys’ power is not without 
limit, is used properly, and is exercised in accordance with the expectations of the general public. 
 This BRIEFING PAPER focuses on the laws most crucial to the protection of the public welfare —and, 
incidentally, those most likely to frame the day-to-day activities of the Federal Government lawyer— 
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to ensure Government attorneys perform their 
duties impartially and with the public welfare in 
mind. In addition, the laws discussed ensure that 
the power and authority vested in Government 
attorneys is used for neither private nor political 
gain. 
 The second part of this PAPER covers the topics 
of information control and confidentiality. Though 
generally subject to the same confidentiality rules 
that should be familiar to any attorney, Government 
attorneys are privy to nonpublic and sometimes 
even classified information,1 the confidentiality 
of which is crucial for the proper functioning of 
the Federal Government. This places Government 
attorneys in a unique position with regard to the 
information in their possession as compared to 
their private sector counterparts. Moreover, this 
part of the PAPER explains the tension between these 
confidentiality requirements and the Freedom 
of Information Act2—a law intended to ensure 
transparency in the operation of the Federal 
Government. Finally, this part provides a brief 
discussion of the Whistleblower Protection Act,3 
which is designed to protect federal employees 
who disclose information relating to Government 
wrongdoing from adverse employment actions 
made in response to the whistleblowing.
Ethical Obligations
 Attorneys are no stranger to ethical rules—they 
are the underpinning of the profession. Govern-
ment attorneys, however, must comply not only 
with ethical rules imposed by the state bar in which 
the attorney is licensed, but with rules unique to 
Government employment. Specifically, one of 
the primary duties of a Government attorney is 
to uphold the ethical standards required of the 
position. Because these public servants are ex-
pected to hold their positions as a “public trust,” 
they are required to comply with a multitude of 
regulations designed to ensure they place “loyalty 
to the Constitution, laws and ethical principles 
above private gain.”4 
 The ethical regime governing attorneys who 
are Executive Branch employees, the focus of 
this BRIEFING PAPER, is found in Part 2635 of 
Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations. These 
regulations were created by the U.S. Office of 
Government Ethics, which has been charged 
with “[p]romulgating…regulations that estab-
lish a single, comprehensive, and clear set of 
executive-branch standards of conduct.”5 These 
“Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees 
of the Executive Branch” provide countless 
rules, exceptions, and exclusions that assist 
the attorneys of the Executive Branch in mak-
ing ethical decisions as stewards of the Federal 
Government.
 In 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101, the regulations de-
scribe the general ethical principles applicable 
to all Executive Branch employees, including 
Government attorneys. The principles have been 
separated into 14 different categories,6 but they 
share the same two underlying tenets:7 
(1) Employees “shall not use public office for 
private gain.” 
(2) Employees “shall act impartially and not 
give preferential treatment to any private 
organization or individual.” 
In addition to these regulations, attorneys are 
subject to various criminal conflict-of-interest 
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statutes, which are discussed in detail below.8 
Government attorneys must also comply with any 
supplemental ethics regulations issued by their 
employing agency.9
 While Government attorneys must act in accor-
dance with all 14 general principles, this BRIEFING 
PAPER focuses on those that are most relevant to 
their daily practice. These particular principles 
prohibit attorneys from engaging in the follow-
ing conduct:10 
(1) Holding a financial interest that conflicts 
with the performance of the attorney’s 
duties.
(2) Engaging in a financial transaction or 
furthering a financial interest by using 
nonpublic Government information.
(3) Soliciting or accepting a gift or other item 
of monetary value from a person seeking 
to obtain an official action from, doing 
business with, or conducting an activity 
regulated by the employee’s agency.
(4) Using public office for private gain.
(5) Giving preferential treatment to an orga-
nization or individual.
(6) Failing to protect and conserve federal 
property and using it for other than au-
thorized activities.
(7) Engaging in outside employment activities, 
including seeking or negotiating employ-
ment, that conflict with official duties.
 In addition to these specific obligations, Gov-
ernment attorneys should not take action or en-
gage in activities that may create the appearance 
that they violate ethical standards.11 The rules’ 
prohibition of even the appearance of unethical 
behavior demonstrates that the rules were written 
not only to hold Government employees to the 
highest ethical standards, but also to ensure the 
public has confidence in their ethical behavior.
 Although the rules discussed below apply in 
general to all Executive Branch employees, the 
discussion in this BRIEFING PAPER is framed in 
terms of compliance with their requirements by 
Government attorneys.
 ■ Gifts From Outside Sources
 The rules governing gifts to Government at-
torneys fall under three different regimes: the 
civil gift statute, located at 5 U.S.C.A. § 7353, 
the OGE gift regulations, located at 5 C.F.R. 
Part 2635, and the criminal bribery and illegal 
gratuities statute, located at 18 U.S.C.A. § 201. 
The three regimes govern related conduct and 
are relevant depending on the intent behind the 
gift and the nature of the item. 
 The civil gift statute, applicable to Govern-
ment employees, including attorneys, in all three 
branches of Government, prohibits them from 
soliciting or accepting of value from a person 
either “(1) seeking official action from, doing 
business with, or (in the case of executive branch 
officers and employees) conducting activities 
regulated by, the individual’s employing entity; or 
(2) whose interests may be substantially affected 
by the performance or nonperformance of the 
individual’s official duties.”12 The statute also 
requires supervising ethics offices, such as the 
OGE, to issue rules or regulations implementing 
the statute.13 The OGE has done so at 5 C.F.R. §§ 
2635.201–.205. The OGE’s gift regulations pro-
hibit similar activity and apply only to Executive 
Branch employees. Under these rules, Govern-
ment attorneys are generally prohibited from 
(directly or indirectly) soliciting or accepting 
“gifts” either (1) from a prohibited source, or 
(2) given because of the attorney’s official posi-
tion.14 These regulations have strong similarities 
to the illegal gratuities statute, 15 though the OGE 
gift rules make clear that unless the gifts are 
accepted in return for being influenced in the 
performance of an official act, the acceptance 
does not constitute an illegal gratuity.16
 To determine whether it is permissible to ac-
cept a gift, the Government attorney must first 
determine whether the item actually constitutes 
a “gift” under the regulations. A “gift” is defined 
broadly and includes many items often provided 
in the commercial marketplace, such as gratu-
ities, discounts, hospitality, loans, forbearance, 
or other items “having monetary value.”17 This 
expansive definition includes free services, spe-
cial discounts, and training (including typical 
expenses associated with training activities, such 
as travel, food, and lodging).18 Attorneys must 
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be cautious whenever a gift is offered because 
the broad definition is likely to cover the item 
in question. 
 Under certain limited circumstances, items 
are excluded from the broad “gift” definition. 
Items excluded from this definition include, but 
are not limited to, the following: 19
(a) Modest items of food and refreshments, 
such as a cup of coffee or doughnut, so 
long as they are not part of a meal.
(b) Items with “little intrinsic value,” such as 
greeting cards or plaques.
(c) Loans from banks or financial institutions 
at favorable rates or commercial discounts, 
as long as they are offered on the same or 
similar terms offered to the general public.
(d) An item purchased at market value by the 
employee.
 Assuming the item is a “gift” under the regu-
lations, the Government attorney must then 
determine whether the item was impermissibly 
provided (1) by a prohibited source or (2) 
because of the Government attorney’s official 
position.21 The regulations define a “prohibited 
source” as a person or organization who (a) 
seeks official action or to do business with the 
Government employee’s agency, (b) conducts 
business or activities with or is regulated by the 
employee’s agency, or (c) has interests that may 
be affected by performance or nonperformance 
of the employee’s official duties.22 For example, 
a 2009 investigation by the Department of 
Justice Office of Inspector General found that 
Robert Flores, the former Administrator of the 
DOJ Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention, violated the ethics regulations by 
accepting a free round of golf from the World 
Golf Foundation and not repaying $159 in golf 
fees until two years later on the day before he 
testified at a congressional hearing on his office’s 
procurement practices. The OIG determined 
that the World Golf Foundation was a prohib-
ited source because at the time Flores accepted 
the free golf game, the foundation’s First Tee 
program, a program designed to teach golf to 
inner city children, was a grantee of the OJJDP 
and it later also received a $500,000 grant from 
Flores’s office based on his recommendation, 
despite its low ranking as compared to other 
applicants.23 
 A gift is “improperly solicited or accepted because 
of the employee’s official position” under the regu-
lations if it would not have been solicited, offered, 
or given if the attorney had not been working for 
the Government.24 In addition, the prohibition 
applies to circumstances under which the gift is 
either solicited or accepted indirectly, which includes 
(1) gifts given with the attorney’s knowledge and 
consent to a member of his immediate family (or 
dependent relative) because of the family member’s 
relationship to the attorney, or (2) given to any 
other person or organization (including charities) 
“on the basis of designation, recommendation, or 
other specification by the employee.”25 This rule is 
designed to prevent Government employees from 
sidestepping the gift ban by either funneling gifts 
through an intermediary or seeking the enrichment 
of a family member or any other designated person 
or entity. If a Government attorney cannot accept 
the gift directly, the attorney should not attempt 
to do so through or for another person. 
 There are several exceptions to the general 
prohibition against the receipt of gifts by Gov-
ernment employees which, if applicable, allow 
the acceptance of a gift by an attorney without 
violating these rules.26 These include, but are not 
limited to the following:
 (a) Gifts of $20 or less—A Government attorney 
may accept unsolicited gifts with an aggregate 
market value of $20 or less per source per occa-
sion, so long as the aggregate market value of 
individual gifts received from a single person 
does not exceed $50 in a calendar year.27 The 
$20 cap is a limit on the value of the entire 
item, not a credit that can be applied in paying 
for the gift. Thus, for example, if an attorney is 
offered lunch, valued at $40, the attorney may 
not accept the offer even if the attorney pays 
the $20 difference. On the other hand, if the 
attorney is given several segregable items, such 
as a $15 mug and $10 pen, while attending a 
conference, he may accept one of the items, 
but not both.28 The exception is inapplicable to 
gifts of cash or investment interests, such as 
stocks or bonds.29 
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 (b) Gifts based on a personal relationship—A 
Government attorney may accept gifts given 
because of a family or personal relationship and 
not because of the attorney’s position.30 Gifts are 
permitted under this exception where it is clear 
that the gift is “motivated by a family relationship 
or personal friendship rather than the position 
of the employee.”31
 (c) Discounts and similar benefits—The excep-
tion for discounts and similar benefits includes 
both items exempt from the definition of gift32 
and other reduced rates, reduced membership 
fees, and favorable rates/commercial discounts 
offered because of the attorney’s status in a 
particular group or professional qualifications 
but unrelated to the attorney’s position with the 
Government.33 
 (d) Awards and honorary degrees—A Government 
attorney may accept a gift, other than cash or 
investment interests, with a market value of $200 
or less, as long as it is a “bona fide award” (or 
incident to) that is given for meritorious public 
service or achievement by a person or organiza-
tion without interests that may be substantially 
affected by the performance or nonperformance 
of the attorney’s official duties.34 If the gift has 
an aggregate market value in excess of $200 and 
otherwise qualifies under this exception, it “may 
be accepted upon a written determination by an 
agency ethics official that the award is made as 
part of an established program of recognition.”35 
 (e) Gifts based on outside business or employment 
relationship—A Government attorney may accept 
gifts, including meals, lodgings, and transporta-
tion, as long as they are provided because of the 
business or employment activities of the attorney’s 
spouse or the outside employment/business 
activities of the attorney and not because of the 
attorney’s official position.36 
 (f) Widely attended gatherings—A Government 
attorney may accept free attendance at an event 
of more than 100 persons, so long as the value of 
the gift of attendance is no more than $335 and 
received from a person other than a sponsor of the 
event.37 “Free attendance” is defined as including 
a waiver of all or part of the fees associated with 
the conference, including “food, refreshments, 
entertainment, instruction and materials furnished 
to all attendees as an integral part of the event.”38 
It does not include expenses for transportation 
and lodging or for “entertainment collateral to 
the event, or meals taken other than in a group 
setting with all other attendees.”39 This exemption 
applies when, among numerous other require-
ments, it has been determined that the employee’s 
attendance is in the interest of the agency.40 This 
is an extraordinarily complicated exception to the 
gift rules. Attorneys are, therefore, urged (and, 
under certain circumstances, required) to obtain 
agency advice and/or permission to attend the 
event.
 While an item may appear to qualify under 
one of these exceptions, attorneys still need to be 
careful. The OGE warns that even if an employee 
may accept a gift under its rules, it “is never wrong 
and is often wise to decline a gift offered by a 
person or organization whose interests could 
be affected by actions of the agency where you 
work or a gift offered because of your official 
position.”41 
 More importantly, under certain circumstances, 
a “gift” that falls under one of the exceptions 
must be rejected if one of the following three 
circumstances is present:42
(1) The gift has been given to influence the 
employee to perform an official act. 
(2) The employee has solicited or coerced the 
offering of the gift.
(3) The employee accepts gifts so frequently 
(from a same or different source) “that a 
reasonable person would be led to believe 
the employee is using his public office for 
private gain.”
 Acceptance of gifts under these three cir-
cumstances could land a Government attorney 
in hot water. Moreover, a violation of the first 
circumstance may even run afoul of the criminal 
bribery and illegal gratuities statute, 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 201.43 Note that unlike the ethics regulations, 
the criminal statute’s prohibitions are not limited 
to the recipient; offenses under the statute may 
be committed by both the recipient and the pro-
vider of the gift.44 The statute’s prohibition against 
bribery, as applicable to Government attorneys, 
“requires a showing that something of value was…
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corruptly demanded, sought, received, accepted, 
or agreed to be received or accepted by a public 
official” in return for “being influenced in the 
performance of any official act.”45 To establish an 
offense of bribery, a quid pro quo is required—or 
a specific intent to “receive something of value 
in exchange for an official act.”46
 The prohibition against gratuities, as applicable 
to Government attorneys, “requires a showing 
that something of value was…demanded, sought, 
received, accepted, or agreed to be received or 
accepted by a public official…‘for or because of 
any official act performed or to be performed 
by such public official.’” 47 Unlike bribery, a quid 
pro quo is not required, and a violation may be 
established by demonstrating that the “thing of 
value” is “merely a reward for some future act that 
the public official will take…or for a past act that 
he has already taken.”48 In other words, there is 
no requirement to establish corrupt intent. 
 All Government attorneys must keep the crimi-
nal bribery and illegal gratuities statute in mind 
when they are offered a “thing of value” or “gift” 
from an outside source. If an attorney decides to 
accept such an item, criminal violations are always 
a risk, as evidenced by the April 2010 conviction 
of Constantine Peter Kallas, the former Assistant 
Chief Counsel with U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement for, among 36 criminal charges, 
accepting bribes as high as $20,000 from illegal 
aliens and green card holders in exchange for 
promising to use his official position to provide 
them with immigration benefits. Kallas faces a 
maximum sentence of up to 256 years in prison 
for his crimes.49 
 Even if acceptance of a particular item does not 
rise to the level of criminality, exemptions from 
the gift rules are extremely narrow and compli-
cated, and a violation could still result in severe 
disciplinary action, including the loss of a job.50 
For this reason, it is imperative that attorneys take 
care when accepting gifts from outside sources. As 
another BRIEFING PAPERS author has recommended, 
“unless a gift falls neatly within an exclusion or 
exception, the safest course of action is to assume 
the gift is prohibited.”51 Before accepting a gift, 
Government attorneys faced with ethical issues 
relating to the gift rules are strongly advised to 
obtain guidance from an agency ethics official 
and to consult the regulations directly.52  If a Gov-
ernment attorney has received a gift that cannot 
be accepted, the attorney must “promptly” “on 
his own initiative” comply with the regulations’ 
requirements regarding “proper disposition of 
prohibited gifts” to avoid being deemed to have 
improperly accepted an unsolicited gift.53 “Proper 
disposition” includes returning the item to the 
donor, paying the donor the market value of the 
gift, or, if the item is perishable, donating the gift 
to charity, sharing it with the attorney’s colleagues, 
or destroying it.54 With respect to entertainment, 
services, or other intangible gifts, the attorney 
may “reimburse the donor the market value.”55 
“Subsequent reciprocation by the employee does 
not constitute reimbursement.”56 
 ■ Gifts Between Government Employees
 In addition to gifts from outside sources, gift 
giving between Government employees, including 
attorneys, is regulated. 57 These rules are particu-
larly relevant in Government offices during the 
holidays and when celebrating employee birthdays. 
Generally, the regulations prohibit Government 
attorneys from directly or indirectly giving or 
soliciting contributions for gifts to an “official 
superior.58 An “official superior” is defined as 
“including but not limited to an immediate su-
pervisor, whose official responsibilities include 
directing or evaluating the performance of the 
employee‘s official duties or those of any other 
official superior of the employee.”59 For purposes 
of these gift rules, an employee is considered to 
be the subordinate of any of his official superi-
ors.60 Government attorneys are also prohibited 
from accepting gifts from Government employees 
receiving less pay.61 The latter rule does not ap-
ply when (a) Government attorneys are not in 
a subordinate-official superior relationship, or 
(b) a personal relationship exists between the 
two Government employees.62 In addition, the 
regulations make clear that “official superior” 
Government attorneys are prohibited from coerc-
ing the offering of a gift from a subordinate.63 In 
other words, Government attorneys in positions 
of power and authority should not demand gifts 
from the individuals they supervise.
 When compared to private sector gift-giving 
practices, the Government prohibition appears 
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far more restrictive. This blanket prohibition is 
somewhat softened by several exceptions to the 
general prohibition. Specifically, the rules permit 
on an “occasional basis,” during celebrations or 
occasions in which “gifts are traditionally given 
or exchanged,” the following gifts to a superior 
employee or from an employee receiving less pay:64 
(1) Noncash gifts, with an aggregate market 
value of $10 or less per occasion. 
(2) Food and refreshments if shared in the 
office among several employees. 
(3) Personal hospitality provided at a residence 
(only if of a type and value customarily pro-
vided by the attorney to personal friends). 
(4) Items given in connection with the receipt 
of personal hospitality if of a type and value 
customarily given on such occasions. 
(5) Under certain circumstance, the transfer 
of employee “leave,” so long as it is not to 
an immediate supervisor. 
In addition to these exceptions, the regulations 
allow gifts for “special, infrequent occasions” 
(e.g., important events such as marriage, illness, 
retirement, or resignation)65 and for “voluntary 
contributions of nominal amounts” for a gift, 
if given infrequently, for a special occasion, or 
for food and refreshments to be shared among 
office employees.66
 ■ Conflicting Financial Interests/Impartiality In  
 Performing Duties
 Similar to the gift restrictions, the statute and 
implementing regulations regarding conflicting 
financial interests and impartiality are designed 
to prevent favorable treatment and impropri-
ety in Government actions. In particular, these 
regulations prohibit a Government attorney from 
engaging in conflicting activities involving actual 
bias by the Government attorney and in those 
that merely give the appearance of such biased 
conflict. 
 With respect to conflicting financial interests, 
18 U.S.C.A. § 208 prohibits a covered Government 
attorney from participating “personally and substan-
tially” in an official Government action or other 
“particular matter,” in which “he, his spouse, minor 
child, general partner, organization in which he is 
serving as officer, director, trustee, general partner 
or employee, or any person or organization with 
whom he is negotiating or has any arrangement 
concerning prospective employment, has a financial 
interest.”67 A “financial interest” exists when, as the 
result of developments in a matter, there is a very 
real, as opposed to speculative, possibility of gain 
or loss.68 
 The prohibitions in this statute are clarified in 
the implementing regulations.69 “Particular matters” 
are defined by the regulations as those “that involve 
deliberation, decision, or action that is focused upon 
the interests of specific persons, or a discrete and 
identifiable class of persons.”70 In other words, the 
definition does not encompass broad policy matters 
designed to affect the interests of large, diverse groups 
of individuals.71 Examples of “particular matters” 
include judicial (or other) proceedings, requests 
for a ruling or other determination, contracts, ap-
plications, claims, or controversies.72 In addition, 
the Government attorney’s participation must be 
both personal and substantial, involving the direct 
participation of the attorney or the attorney’s su-
pervision of a subordinate’s direct participation in 
a matter.73 If a Government attorney is faced with a 
situation prohibited by these regulations, absent a 
waiver, the attorney must either divest the interest 
or disqualify himself or herself from the matter.74
 The purpose of the statute and its implementing 
regulations is to prevent Government attorneys 
from advancing their personal interests at the 
expense of the public welfare.75 DOJ attorney 
Robert Coughlin did just that when he violated, 
among other statutes, 18 U.S.C.A. § 208. While 
working at the DOJ, Coughlin accepted over $4,000 
worth of meals and sports tickets from lobbyist 
Kevin Ring, who worked for then-lobbyist and 
now-convicted felon, Jack Abramoff.76 Coughlin 
accepted these gifts in exchange for, among many 
other things, leaking internal information, set-
ting up meetings, and lobbying his colleagues 
at the DOJ on behalf of Abramoff’s clients.77 In 
addition, Coughlin helped waive a competitive 
bidding requirement and secure a $16.3 mil-
lion grant for one of Abramoff’s clients—a feat 
that involved persuading other DOJ officials to 
reverse an original award of $9 million.78 Follow-
ing Coughlin’s guilty plea, the judge sentenced 
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Coughlin to 30 days in a halfway house and three 
years supervised release and ordered him to pay 
a $2,000 fine.79
 In addition to prohibiting conflicting financial 
interests, the regulations regarding impartiality 
prohibit Government attorneys from engaging 
in activities that merely give the appearance of 
bias in the performance of official duties. Two 
circumstances are covered under this prohibi-
tion. First, a Government attorney is prohibited 
from participating in matters that are likely to 
affect the financial interests of a member of the 
attorney’s household or a person with whom 
the attorney has a “covered relationship” where 
these circumstances would cause a “reasonable 
person with knowledge of the relevant facts to 
question [the attorney’s] impartiality in the mat-
ter.”80 A “covered relationship” is one in which the 
employee has a very close personal or business 
relationship with an individual.81 For example, 
a DOJ attorney may not participate in a matter 
in which he is responsible for investigating and 
potentially prosecuting a company that employs 
his spouse. Under these circumstances, the at-
torney is prohibited from participating in the 
matter unless authorized after disclosure to an 
agency designee.82 
 The second type of impartial activity covered by 
the regulations relates to Government attorneys 
who have received extraordinary severance (or 
other) payments from former employers before 
employment with the Government.83 If such 
payment is received, the attorney is disqualified 
for two years from participating in particular 
matters in which the former employer is a party 
(or represents a party).84 An “extraordinary 
payment” includes cash or other investment 
interests valued greater than $10,000 and paid 
after it has been made known to the former em-
ployer that the attorney is under consideration 
for or has accepted a Government position and 
is unrelated to the former employer’s “estab-
lished compensation, partnership, or benefits 
program.”85 “A compensation, partnership, or 
benefits program will be deemed an established 
program if it is contained in bylaws, a contract 
or other written form, or if there is a history of 
similar payments made to others not entering 
into Federal service.”86 The disqualification may 
be waived by the attorney’s agency if it is deter-
mined that the payment is “not so substantial 
as to cause a reasonable person to question the 
[attorney’s] ability to act impartially in a matter 
in which the former employer is or represents 
a party.”87 
 ■ Seeking Other Employment
 Ethical restrictions applicable to Government 
attorneys are not limited to their employment 
with the Government. An attorney seeking em-
ployment outside the Government is also subject 
to a complex set of regulations designed to pre-
vent conflicts of interest, bias, and other ethical 
quandaries that may give outsiders the impression 
that the attorney lacks the necessary impartiality. 
 Similar to the conflict-of-interest regulations,88 
the OGE regulations regarding seeking employ-
ment outside the Government are designed to 
ensure compliance with the authorizing statute, 
18 U.S.C.A. § 208(a), which requires “an em-
ployee [to] disqualify himself from participation 
in any particular matter that will have a direct 
and predictable effect on the financial interests 
of a person ‘with whom he is negotiating or has 
any arrangement concerning prospective employ-
ment.’”89 The regulations broadly define “employ-
ment” as “any form of non-Federal employment 
or business relationship involving the provision of 
personal services by the employee, whether to be 
undertaken at the same time as or subsequent to 
Federal employment.”90 A Government attorney 
is deemed to be “seeking employment” when, 
either directly or indirectly:91 
(a) The attorney is engaged in actual negotia-
tions for employment; 
(b) A prospective employer has contacted the 
attorney about possible employment and 
the attorney makes a response other than 
rejection; or 
(c) The attorney has contacted a prospective 
employer about possible employment, un-
less the sole purpose of the contact is to 
request a job application or if the person 
contacted is affected by the performance 
of the attorney’s duties only as part of an 
industry.
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 The regulations define “negotiations” for em-
ployment broadly as any “discussion or communica-
tion with another person, or such person’s agent 
or intermediary, mutually conducted with a view 
toward reaching an agreement regarding possible 
employment with that person” and “not limited 
to discussions of specific terms and conditions of 
employment in a specific position.”92 While gen-
eral or exploratory discussions do not constitute 
negotiations, when a “potential employer and 
potential employee engage in discussions with a 
specific position in mind, they are negotiating, 
even if all the details are not discussed.” 93
 A Government attorney is no longer seeking 
employment under the regulations if (1) either 
party rejects the possibility of employment and 
all discussions of possible employment cease, or 
(2) two months have elapsed since the attorney’s 
submission of an unsolicited resume and the 
attorney has received no expression of interest 
from the prospective employer.94 To be clear, a 
rejection must be overt and obvious—a deferral 
of employment discussions until sometime in 
the near future is not considered a “rejection” 
of prospective employment.95 
 To prevent a violation of the relevant statu-
tory and regulatory authority, an attorney must 
either (a) terminate employment discussions or 
(b) voluntarily cease the personal and substan-
tial participation in the particular matter that 
will have a “direct and predictable effect on the 
financial interests of a prospective employer with 
whom [the attorney] is seeking employment.”96 
 ■ Misuse Of Position
 In addition to improper influence from outside 
sources, the ethics rules also heavily regulate a 
Government attorney’s use of official time and 
position.97 These rules include four different 
prohibitions: (1) use of public office for private 
gain, (2) use of nonpublic information, (3) use 
of Government property, and (4) use of official 
property.98
 The first prohibition bars Government attorneys 
from using their public office for their own (or 
another’s) private gain.99 Specifically, the regula-
tions prohibit a Government attorney from using 
the attorney’s official position to induce or coerce 
other persons “to provide any benefit, financial 
or otherwise, to [the attorney] or to friends, 
relatives, or persons with whom the [attorney] 
is affiliated in a nongovernmental capacity.”100 
The rule is straightforward: Government attor-
neys may not use their official title and office 
to scare or threaten another person into giving 
them something for private gain. A correlating 
provision prohibits a Government attorney from 
using the attorney’s title or “authority” to imply 
that the Government has sanctioned or endorsed 
the attorney’s personal activities.101 Similarly, 
Government attorneys are prohibited from using 
their position and the Government’s authority to 
endorse products, services, or enterprises, unless 
statutory authority or agency standards exist to do 
so or “as the result of recognition for achievement 
given under an agency program of recognition for 
accomplishment in support of the agency‘s mis-
sion.”102 While these prohibitions prevent clearly 
egregious abuses of power, they also ensure that 
Government attorneys are properly representing 
themselves when engaged in outside activities. If, 
for example, a Government attorney wishes to 
represent a pro bono client, the attorney must 
make clear that the legal advice is not coming 
from the Government and that the attorney is 
acting in his or her individual capacity.103 
 The second prohibition forbids a Government 
attorney from engaging in a financial transaction, 
or otherwise seeking to further a private inter-
est, using nonpublic information.104 “Nonpublic 
information” is defined as “information that the 
employee gains by reason of Federal employment 
and that [the employee] knows or reasonably 
should know has not been made available to the 
general public,” including information deemed 
confidential by law (or designated as such by an 
agency official) or otherwise not made available 
to the public.105
 The third and fourth prohibitions on the 
“misuse” of an attorney’s position deal with the 
use of Government property and “official time.” 
Specifically, unless otherwise authorized to do 
so, an attorney may not use Government prop-
erty (e.g., Government computers, phones, and 
office supplies) for unauthorized purposes.106 
Similarly, unless authorized to spend “official 
time” for unofficial purposes, an attorney’s 
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“official time” must be used “in an honest effort 
to perform official duties.”107 The regulations 
also prohibit an attorney from ordering a subor-
dinate to use official time to perform unofficial 
or unauthorized activities.108 These prohibitions 
are no different than the rules found in private 
offices across the country that ban an employee’s 
use of an employer’s computer to send messages 
to friends on Facebook or the employer’s phone 
to make lengthy, long-distance personal calls or 
prohibit the employee from spending time “on 
the clock” running personal errands. While the 
OGE regulations generally prohibit the use of 
office materials and official time for unofficial 
purposes, many agencies have promulgated 
regulations that permit such activity as long as 
the cost to the Government is negligible.109 For 
example, if a Government attorney wants to 
represent a pro bono client, the attorney may 
use small amounts of paper, use a Government 
computer in a limited manner, and make a lim-
ited number of local phone calls to handle the 
matter.110 While this is permitted under certain 
circumstances, attorneys must be careful as the 
line between what is considered negligible and 
what is deemed a misuse of Government property 
is not always clear. Thus, as with the other ethics 
regulations, Government attorneys should seek 
the opinion of an agency ethic’s official before 
seeking to use Government property or time for 
personal reasons. 
 ■ Outside Or Unofficial Activities
 In addition to an attorney’s official actions, 
the ethics regulations apply to a Government 
attorney’s unofficial activities outside the office. 
For example, many Government attorneys teach 
classes at local law schools, while others may hold 
leadership positions in professional organizations. 
These activities are not only permitted under the 
regulations, they are also often encouraged by 
high-ranking agency officials seeking to increase 
the prominence of their agency’s attorneys. 
 The rules relating to outside activities apply 
regardless of whether the attorney receives com-
pensation.111 Moreover, while generally permit-
ted, attorneys must be certain that the activities 
comply with a host of additional requirements 
and limitations.112 These include, but are not 
limited to, the prohibition on outside employ-
ment or any other outside activity that conflicts 
with the employee’s official duties, any agency-
specific requirement for prior approval of outside 
employment or activities, and limitations on 
outside earned income, participation in profes-
sional organizations, or paid/unpaid teaching, 
speaking, and writing opportunities.113 Activities 
must also comply with the various statutes and 
regulations that prohibit, in general, the use 
of public office for private gain and providing 
preferential treatment to any particular private 
organization or individual.114
 For example, an attorney may not disclose 
nonpublic information while teaching class at 
a law school.115 Although disclosing nonpublic 
anecdotes about an agency matter would un-
doubtedly maintain students’ level of interest, 
such behavior would violate the law. The regula-
tions covering outside activities are lengthy and 
complex, so again attorneys are encouraged, and 
often required, to speak to their agency ethics 
officials before engaging in or accepting an out-
side opportunity. 
 ■ Hatch Act
 Government attorneys must also be aware of 
the legal constraints on their political activity. 
The “Hatch Act” regulates the political activities 
of Executive Branch attorneys.116 The level and 
type of restrictions on political activity are directly 
correlated to an attorney’s position. Specifically, 
Government attorneys are generally divided into 
two categories: “Less Restricted Government 
employees” and “Further Restricted Government 
employees.”117 Special, unrestricted rules govern 
a third and less common group of Government 
employees. This group includes Government at-
torneys appointed by the President by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate and those 
paid from an appropriation for the Executive 
Office of the President.118 The political activities 
of these Government attorneys are fairly unre-
stricted, so long as the activities are not paid for 
by money from the U.S. Treasury.119
 Most Executive Branch attorneys fall under the 
“Less Restricted Government employees” category, 
allowing them to engage in common political 
activities.120 In contrast, attorneys categorized 
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as “Further Restricted Government employees” 
are typically employed by agencies devoted to 
intelligence, law enforcement, and elections and 
are prohibited from engaging in most partisan 
political activity.121 
 “Less Restricted” Government attorneys may 
engage in a wide variety of political activities, 
including, but not limited to, running for office 
in nonpartisan elections, campaigning for or 
against candidates in partisan elections, assisting 
in voter registration drives, contributing to politi-
cal organizations, attending political fundraisers, 
rallies, or meetings, or actively participating or 
holding office in a political party or club.122 They 
are still, however, prohibited from engaging in 
certain political activities as representatives of the 
Federal Government, such as the following:123 
(1) Improperly using official authority to influ-
ence an election.
(2) Soliciting or discouraging the political 
activity of a person with business before 
the attorney’s agency.
(3) Running for office in a partisan political 
election. 
(4) Engaging in political activity while on duty, 
in a Government office, wearing an official 
uniform, using a Government vehicle, or 
using an official title or position. 
(5) Hosting political fundraisers.
(6) Accepting donations for a partisan politi-
cal group, party or candidate for partisan 
political office.
 In addition, “Less Restricted” supervisory attorneys 
are prohibited from inviting subordinate Govern-
ment attorneys to political events or activities or 
suggesting “that they attend the political event or 
undertake any partisan political activity.”124 More-
over, while either on duty or in a federal building, 
they may not, for example, wear partisan items of 
clothing or accessories, distribute or display cam-
paign materials, post partisan statements (includ-
ing blog postings) on the internet, or send emails 
advocating for or against “a partisan political party, 
candidate for partisan political office, or partisan 
political group.”125 
 The last restriction tends to cause the most 
problems for Government attorneys, as evidenced 
by the U.S. Office of Special Counsel’s charges 
filed against Bruce Buchanan, an attorney for 
the National Labor Relations Board.126 The OSC 
alleged, among other charges, that while on duty 
and in his NLRB office, Buchanan prepared two 
briefing memoranda for a candidate for U.S. 
Senate in which he used his official Government 
title.127 Moreover, while on duty, Buchanan also 
allegedly “solicited the assistance of a subordi-
nate employee” to prepare memoranda for the 
campaign (including one which sought campaign 
contributions), and made a telephone call on 
behalf of the candidate to an organization with 
business before the NLRB.128 The OSC charged 
Buchanan with five different Hatch Act violations, 
and in a consent judgment, Buchanan admitted to 
violating the law and agreed to be removed from 
federal employment.129 While this case involved a 
significant number of Hatch Act violations, lesser 
activity may still run afoul of the law. 
 Unlike “Less Restricted Government attorneys,” 
“Further Restricted Government attorneys,” as the 
name indicates, have far less freedom to engage 
in political activities due to the nature of work 
conducted at their agencies. These Government 
attorneys are permitted to engage in certain 
activities such as assisting in nonpartisan voting 
registration drives or campaigns in which none 
of the candidates represents a political party, 
contributing money to political organizations or 
attending political events, or being a candidate 
for public office in a nonpartisan election.130 
“Further Restricted Government attorneys,” 
however, are prohibited from engaging in the 
same activities as “Less Restricted Government 
attorneys,” plus many others relating to partisan 
political activity.131 The OSC provides a lengthy 
list of prohibited activities on its website.132
 In recent years, the most common violations 
of the Hatch Act have resulted from an employ-
ee’s political activities on the internet. Sending 
political emails or posting political messages 
on websites during the work day may result in 
a violation of the law. For example, the OSC 
filed a complaint charging an Internal Revenue 
Service agent with violating the Hatch Act when 
he forwarded an email to numerous individuals 
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(including co-workers) from then-presidential 
candidate Barack Obama soliciting online cam-
paign contributions.133 The agent sent the email 
while on duty from his Government office, “and 
the e-mail included his name, title, group, duty 
location, and telephone number.”134 Although the 
Merit Systems Protection Board determined the 
violation did not warrant removal in this matter, 
it found otherwise in a similar case involving an 
Assistant U.S. Trustee employed at the DOJ. The 
MSPB ordered the removal of the attorney for 
her violations of the Hatch Act because, unlike 
the IRS agent, she solicited contributions from 
subordinate Government attorneys.135 In this 
matter, the attorney violated the Hatch Act by 
“using her official authority or influence to co-
erce a subordinate employee” to make a political 
contribution to a gubernatorial candidate.136 She 
also admitted that she was aware of the Hatch 
Act and knew the solicitation “was a little outside 
the rules.” 137 While both cases involved a single 
solicitation without followup action, the MSPB 
opinion ordering removal appears to rely heavily 
on the fact that the matter involved the coercion 
of a subordinate.138 
 The decision to remove an employee from 
office for violating the Hatch Act turns on 
numerous factors. As explained by the MSPB, 
“[g]enerally, a Hatch Act violation warrants re-
moval if it occurred under circumstances demon-
strating a deliberate disregard of the Act.”139 For 
Government attorneys, removal is a serious risk, 
especially for those who are aware of the Hatch 
Act and should know better than to engage in 
such activity. For example, a staff attorney at the 
Small Business Administration lost his job at the 
agency because, even though he was aware of the 
Hatch Act and its prohibitions, he “received, read, 
drafted or sent more than 100 emails” using his 
Government computer to engage in prohibited 
political activity. 140 Even if a matter does not result 
in such a severe penalty, violations of the Hatch 
Act may warrant suspension from work without 
pay.141 Likewise, given the high ethical standards 
to which Government attorneys are held, ethical 
violations of this nature are likely to result in a 
significant black mark on an attorney’s career. 
Thus, attorneys are encouraged to check the 
OSC’s Hatch Act website for information,142 re-
quest an advisory opinion from the OSC Hatch 
Act Unit,143 or seek counsel from their agency 
ethics advisors before engaging in any partisan 
political activities. 
Obligations To Control Information
 Similar to the rules regarding ethics, all at-
torneys, whether or not they work for the Gov-
ernment, must take care of the information 
entrusted with them. Every state’s ethical rules 
require attorneys to maintain the confidential-
ity of information provided to them by clients. 
For example, the District of Columbia’s Rules of 
Professional Conduct provide, with very limited 
exceptions, that a lawyer cannot knowingly “re-
veal a confidence or secret of the lawyer’s client,” 
an obligation that “continues after termination 
of the lawyer’s employment.”144 Such duties of 
confidentiality certainly apply to Government 
attorneys. Indeed, the District of Columbia’s 
ethical rules make this clear for its attorneys by 
providing that, for purposes of its confidential-
ity requirements, the “client of the government 
lawyer is the agency that employs the lawyer” 
unless otherwise provided in the law.145
 However, Government attorneys face a unique 
tension with their handling of nonpublic infor-
mation. On one hand, many statutes and regula-
tions require Government attorneys to protect 
and withhold information from third parties, 
augmenting the ethical rules’ requirement for 
confidential treatment of client information. 
On the other hand, ethical rules often allow 
Government attorneys to disclose confidential 
information where “permitted or authorized by 
law”146—an important exception given that federal 
law requires agencies to disseminate informa-
tion requested by the public, and even provides 
many Government attorneys and other Govern-
ment employees with protections to encourage 
“whistleblowing” about agency misconduct. In 
light of this tension, Government attorneys should 
be cognizant of how they create, share, and oth-
erwise handle the large amounts of information 
available to them as Executive Branch employees. 
The choices that these attorneys make often affect 
their competing responsibilities and could even 
eliminate options for what can be done with the 
materials in question. 
 Briefing Papers © 2011 by Thomson Reuters
★   FEBRUARY    BRIEFING PAPERS    2011    ★
13
 Government attorneys must comply with an 
overarching ethical requirement that all attorneys 
face: keeping the confidences of their clients, i.e., 
“the agency that employs the lawyer.”147 In addition, 
Government attorneys are prohibited by law from 
releasing certain information, as seen with the 
criminal code’s prohibition against the disclosure 
of certain information “relating to the national 
defense” by any person authorized to possess such 
information to any person not authorized to pos-
sess such information—for example, the disclosure 
of top secret military information to the media.148 
Government attorneys also may be required to 
protect certain information under statutes or rules 
that apply only to their agency. For example, the 
Federal Trade Commission Act makes clear that 
the Federal Trade Commission “shall not have 
the authority to make public any trade secret or 
any commercial of financial information which is 
obtained for any person and which is privileged or 
confidential,” with limited exceptions.149
 As a result, Government attorneys should be 
cognizant of how their work might be affected 
by such statutes and fiercely guard against releas-
ing any materials that fall under the ambit of 
specifically prescribed law or rules prohibiting 
the disclosure of such information. In addition, 
given the general duty of confidentiality to their 
“client,” Government attorneys generally should 
be careful to keep the confidences of the infor-
mation entrusted to them by their agencies and 
not reveal any information unless required or 
permitted to do so by law.
 At the same time, the information that Gov-
ernment attorneys obtain and possess is quite 
frequently released to individuals and organiza-
tions outside their agencies. This BRIEFING PAPER 
focuses on the two primary avenues for such 
release: the Freedom of Information Act150 and 
the Whistleblower Protection Act.151
 ■ Freedom Of Information Act 
 The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. 
§ 552, is the primary vehicle for the public to 
request and obtain materials possessed by Gov-
ernment attorneys. First, FOIA requires agencies 
to automatically disclose certain types of agency 
information, such as final rules or adjudicative 
records.152 For any other information not affir-
matively disclosed, FOIA also generally requires 
agencies to “make…promptly available to any 
person” such records upon a request that reason-
ably describes the materials sought.153 
 However, this requirement to disclose informa-
tion to a requester is subject to a number of provi-
sions in FOIA that exempt certain materials from 
release. By creating these exemptions, Congress 
acknowledged that, despite the importance of 
encouraging Government transparency and an 
informed citizenry, agencies also need to protect 
some types of information.154 Thus, FOIA specifi-
cally prohibits “intelligence community” agencies 
from making available any records to any foreign 
Government entity or representative.155 These 
agencies include, among others, the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and 
various intelligence elements of the Department of 
State, the Department of Homeland Security, the 
Department of Defense, and the branches of the 
military.156 In addition, Congress allows agencies, 
in their discretion, to withhold any materials that 
fall under one of the nine exemptions listed at 5 
U.S.C.A. § 552(b). The exemptions that are particu-
larly relevant to the practice of most Government 
attorneys include:
(a) Materials that are exempted from release 
by another statute, such as the provision 
prohibiting the FTC from sharing trade 
secrets and other confidential business 
information described above (Exemption 
3).
(b) Materials that are either trade secrets or 
privileged or confidential commercial or 
financial information obtained from a 
person (Exemption 4).
(c) Inter- or intra-agency materials that “would 
not be available by law to a party…in litiga-
tion with the agency,” including privileged 
attorney-client communications, attorney 
work product, or materials used in the 
agency’s internal deliberative process (Ex-
emption 5). 
(d) Materials “disclosure of which would con-
stitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy” (Exemption 6).
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Thus, if one of the FOIA exemptions applies to 
the requested information, an agency can choose 
to withhold the materials. Given that the agency 
may have the discretion to release the materials 
even if an exemption applies, assuming no other 
statute prohibits disclosure, Government attorneys 
should be aware that even exempt materials might 
end up in the hands of the public should the 
agency’s FOIA official choose to release them.161 
In addition, because FOIA requires the release of 
any segregable portions of a document, materials 
must be released if the exempt portions can be 
redacted and if no other exemption applies to 
the remaining information.162
 This BRIEFING PAPER focuses on the four FOIA 
exemptions described above that are relevant to 
the information handling of most Government 
attorneys: Exemptions 3, 4, 5, and 6. For specific 
guidance regarding FOIA, Government attorneys 
should contact their agencies’ designated FOIA 
officer.163 
 ■ FOIA Exemption 3
 Exemption 3 is FOIA’s “cross-referencing” 
exemption, as it authorizes agencies to withhold 
materials if another statute either “requires that 
the matters be withheld from the public in such 
a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue” 
or “establishes particular criteria for withhold-
ing or refers to particular types of matters to be 
withheld.”164 Statutes enacted after the enactment 
of the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009, i.e., after Octo-
ber 29, 2009, would also trigger Exemption 3 by 
specifically referring to its section in FOIA.165
 While not all Government attorneys can look 
to other statutes outside of FOIA to protect their 
records, such a statute, when one is available, 
provides a significant method of protecting 
materials from FOIA release. A statute that pro-
hibits sharing, such as the FTC Act’s prohibition 
on sharing certain business materials described 
above,166 is likely to trigger Exemption 3 as a stat-
ute that “leaves no discretion on the issue,” and 
thereby excuses—indeed, prohibits—an agency 
disclosing such information under FOIA. In ad-
dition to statutes that outright prohibit certain 
disclosures, a statute may simply exempt from 
FOIA disclosure certain materials, as the FTC 
Act does with any materials the FTC receives in 
law enforcement investigations “pursuant to any 
compulsory process…or which is provided vol-
untarily in place of such compulsory process.”167 
 This exemption is particularly important to 
Government attorneys because it provides a 
categorical exemption for materials that many 
Government attorneys possess, such as the law 
enforcement materials that many FTC attorneys 
typically seek and obtain from investigative targets. 
Accordingly, in addition to learning about the 
specific prohibitions against disclosing certain 
information, Government attorneys should be well 
aware of statutes that exempt certain materials 
from FOIA when they assess whether to request, 
obtain, or compile information. Given that courts 
must determine whether a statute meets the 
specific requirements in Exemption 3 necessary 
to trigger the exemption, Government attorneys 
should check with their agencies’ designated 
FOIA officers to learn about the existence and 
scope of any such statutes that have been found 
to meet the requirements of Exemption 3.168 
 ■ FOIA Exemption 4
 The work of Government attorneys frequently 
requires them to obtain, review, and otherwise 
possess sensitive business information. For in-
stance, Government attorneys often seek and 
obtain confidential business information in the 
course of a law enforcement investigation to 
assist in determining whether any wrongdoing 
occurred. Another example is the confidential 
business materials typically submitted to support 
grant applications or bids or proposals that at-
torneys often review.169 In addition, companies 
may provide confidential information to educate 
Government attorneys who are creating rules, 
drafting reports, or advising Congress on pro-
posed legislation.
 Exemption 4 of FOIA exempts from release 
“trade secrets” and any “privileged or confi-
dential” commercial or financial information 
received from parties—in other words, certain 
confidential business materials.170 This exemption 
protects both the interests of those submitting 
confidential business documents, as well as the 
Government’s interest in obtaining coopera-
tion from parties who might otherwise resist 
submitting confidential business information 
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for fear that it might end up in the hands of 
competitors.171 Thus, to further these interests 
as related to their work, Government attorneys 
seeking and possessing such confidential busi-
ness materials should be aware of the extent to 
which such materials are protected from FOIA’s 
disclosure requirements.172
 To understand what Exemption 4 protects, 
Government attorneys should recognize that the 
generally accepted definition of a “trade secret” 
for FOIA purposes is a “secret, commercially 
valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is 
used for the making, preparing, compounding, or 
processing of trade commodities and that can be 
said to be the end product of either innovation or 
substantial effort” and that is directly related to 
the productive process.173 Thus, a “trade secret” 
is not just any secretive business information—
the term only encompasses information about a 
secretive way of creating a product.
 Broader protection for commercial business 
information comes from Exemption 4’s reference 
to “commercial or financial” information that 
is either “privileged or confidential.” Attorneys 
should be aware that, while courts often construe 
this phrase broadly to encompass most information 
that relates to commerce,174 whether the material 
is confidential so that it is exempt from FOIA 
depends on the circumstances. Under the test 
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in National 
Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, materials 
that the submitter was compelled to provide to 
the Government are deemed “confidential” if 
their release would either “impair the govern-
ment’s ability to obtain necessary information 
in the future” or “cause substantial harm to the 
competitive position of the person from whom 
the information was obtained.”175 Subsequently, 
in Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, the Supreme Court determined that 
materials that were voluntarily submitted to the 
Government are deemed “confidential” if the 
submitter does not “customarily” disclose the 
information to the public.176 Courts objectively 
determine which test to apply based on whether 
a legal requirement exists for submitting the 
information at issue and not based on the sub-
jective beliefs of the submitter.177 Thus, even if 
the agency incorrectly tells the third party that 
providing materials is voluntary or mistakenly 
refers to the submission as mandatory, a court 
would not be swayed by the agency’s mistaken 
representations and will instead focus on whether 
the submission truly was mandatory.178
 Based on these differing tests, an agency can 
more easily justify withholding voluntary submis-
sions because it need only show that the submit-
ter treats the material as confidential. The task 
of explaining how the release might affect the 
agency’s information-gathering purposes or the 
submitter’s competitive position as required for 
withholding compelled information is decidedly 
more difficult. Thus, a court’s decision on which 
standard to apply is critical to its assessment of 
the withholding, as it was in Finkel v. U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor.179 In that case, the agency argued 
that certain withheld materials had been volun-
tarily submitted because the submitters did not 
insist on compulsory process, which would have 
allowed the agency to argue under the more 
lenient Critical Mass standard that the materials 
were confidential.180 The court, however, found 
that the agency collected the data pursuant to 
regulations that gave it the authority to “inspect 
and investigate” any workplace, in other words, 
“pursuant to regulatory compulsion.”181 As a 
result, the court employed the stricter National 
Parks test and found that the agency failed that 
test and that Exemption 4 did not apply.182 In 
light of this important difference between the 
National Parks and Critical Mass standards, where 
the manner of requesting the information could 
affect whether the materials are exempt under 
FOIA, Government attorneys should be cognizant 
of this distinction when obtaining commercial or 
financial information from third parties.
 ■ FOIA Exemption 5
 Nearly all Government attorneys participate in 
the planning process at their agencies. Whether 
consulting with a client, preparing for litigation, 
or determining an agency’s course of action, 
Government attorneys create, share, and possess 
information that reveals the internal given-and-
take typical inside the Executive Branch. FOIA 
Exemption 5 protects such materials from public 
disclosure. This exemption states that an agency 
may withhold from release any “inter-agency or 
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intra-agency memorandums or letters which would 
not be available by law to a party other than an 
agency in litigation with the agency.”183 Courts 
have interpreted this language as exempting from 
FOIA those agency materials that are privileged 
from discovery in federal civil litigation,184 and the 
three key privileges invoked by Exemption 5 are 
those protecting attorney-client communications, 
attorney work product, and materials created as 
part of an agency’s deliberative process.185
 As a threshold matter, because of its “inter-
agency” and “intra-agency” qualifiers, Exemption 
5 typically protects only those materials that are 
not shared outside of the Executive Branch. 
Thus, once materials that would have otherwise 
qualified for Exemption 5 are shared outside of 
the Executive Branch family—even, in some oc-
casions, with state law enforcement or with Con-
gress—those materials may no longer be exempt 
under Exemption 5.186 When assessing whether 
an outside entity communicating with the agency 
qualifies as an agency consultant or some other 
“intra-agency” body, courts look to see whether 
the outside person or group was acting only in 
the agency’s interest, rather than in the person 
or group’s own private interests.187 In addition, 
courts are unlikely to find that an outside entity 
meets the “intra/inter-agency” requirement if 
the person or group is applying for a benefit in 
competition with other applicants.188
 Thus, a Government attorney should keep in 
mind that sharing internal materials with outsid-
ers might vitiate the applicability of Exemption 
5. For example, an attorney might rightly believe 
that plea discussions with a defendant would be 
aided by sharing certain attorney work product 
with the target’s counsel, such as drafts of the 
settlement proposal or internal views regarding 
the litigation. However, as seen in Center for Auto 
Safety v. Department of Justice, if an attorney decides 
to share materials externally in such a manner, 
even if the documents appear at first to involve 
the agency’s deliberative process with “personal 
predecisional views of subordinate agency offi-
cials,” a court could determine that, although the 
documents “may at one time have been used for 
internal advisory purposes and would therefore 
be protected,” sharing the documents outside 
the Executive Branch family caused the docu-
ments to lose their status as an internal docu-
ments and their qualification under Exemption 
5.189 If a Government attorney fails to consider 
the ramification of sharing internal information 
on the agency’s ability to withhold the materials 
from a FOIA requester, an agency might find that 
otherwise privileged materials must be released 
to the public.
 As noted above, Exemption 5 is most typically 
invoked to protect attorney-client communica-
tions, work product, or deliberative materials. 
FOIA’s protection of materials under Exemption 
5 is “coextensive with the scope of the discovery 
privileges it incorporates,” meaning that Exemp-
tion 5 protects attorney-client and work-product 
materials in a manner that tracks how the privileges 
are treated in federal courts.190 Thus, this BRIEF-
ING PAPER focuses on Exemption 5’s protection 
of deliberative materials that uniquely applies to 
the Government and leaves the other privileges 
to the many publications that focus on these 
common civil litigation privileges.191
 To protect an agency’s deliberative process 
from public exposure, Exemption 5 exempts from 
disclosure “predecisional” materials that are part 
of the process of making recommendations or 
expressing opinions on legal or policy matters.192 
To qualify for the exemption, the materials need 
not lead to an actual agency decision. Rather, the 
materials can be part of a decisionmaking process 
regardless of the eventual outcome, such as part 
of an agency’s continuing need to assess policies 
to determine whether and what changes might 
be needed.193 As a result, Exemption 5 protects a 
broad universe of documents and often protects 
documents with recommendations or advisory 
guidance, internal communications deliberating 
on agency action or policy, and most draft docu-
ments. However, Exemption 5 generally does not 
protect “postdecisional” documents that provide 
final policy statements and implementations, legal 
opinions, or explanations of agency decisions.194 
Thus, this distinction between predecisional and 
postdecisional materials is critical to a court’s 
determination of whether Exemption 5 applies 
to the withheld documents.
 Of course, courts have found gray areas be-
tween the pre- and post-decisional categories of 
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materials. As the Supreme Court has noted, “the 
line between predecisional documents and post-
decisional documents may not always be a bright 
one.”195 As one court has found, even materials 
created after the agency’s final decision could 
be protected if they reveal deliberations from 
before the decision was made, such as an email 
“where an agency employee reiterated his own 
recommendations shortly after the decision was 
made.”196 Nevertheless, Government attorneys 
generally should be aware of the difference be-
tween these two categories when they create and 
manage information regarding agency actions. 
Broadly speaking, a document created to assist 
the agency in making a decision is more likely 
exempt from FOIA, while a document created 
to provide, implement, or otherwise describe a 
final decision is likely outside the scope of the 
exemption. For example, a memorandum by an 
IRS field officer analyzing whether to take certain 
actions against an individual taxpayer would be 
predecisional, i.e., antecedent of the decision 
regarding the taxpayer, while documents contain-
ing legal advice to field offices for drafting such 
memoranda would be postdecisional because 
even though the legal advice documents “may 
precede the field office’s decision in a particular 
taxpayer’s case, they do not precede the decision 
regarding the agency’s legal position.”197 
 In addition, Government attorneys should be 
aware that the deliberative process privilege gener-
ally does not extend to factual information, such 
as a segregable factual background section of a 
deliberative memorandum. While agencies have 
successfully withheld factual materials that would 
expose the agency’s deliberative process, such 
as factual summaries of nonfinal recommenda-
tions198 or deliberatively chosen selections of facts 
presented to a decisionmaker,199 courts often find 
that factual descriptions are not exempt despite 
being part of a deliberative document.200 Thus, 
attorneys should be mindful that any presentation 
of facts, even embedded in clearly deliberative 
materials, could be segregated from the docu-
ment and disclosed to the FOIA requester.
 ■ FOIA Exemption 6
 Government attorneys frequently obtain in-
formation about individuals regardless of the 
attorneys’ type of work. For example, people 
submit personal information, such as their name, 
address, social security number, and financial data 
on tax forms that may be reviewed by Govern-
ment attorneys. Similar information is typically 
required on requests for financial benefits that 
may need attorney review, such as student loan 
documents. In addition, Government attorneys’ 
law enforcement investigations are a magnet for 
personal information, whether received pursuant 
to subpoenas or similar informational demands, 
collected surreptitiously through wiretaps or 
informants, or provided voluntarily through 
consumer complaint databases or other such 
reporting mechanisms.
 Regardless of the method of collection, FOIA 
seeks to protect the privacy of ordinary citizens, 
including Government employees, by exempt-
ing from disclosure private information about 
individuals.201 Exemption 6, which is applicable 
to all agency materials, allows the withholding 
of personal information if an agency shows that 
disclosure “would constitute a clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy.”202 There is greater 
protection under another exemption for private 
information in law enforcement records, which 
is briefly mentioned below.
 As a threshold matter, application of FOIA Ex-
emption 6 requires that the information implicate 
an “individual’s control of information concerning 
his or her person,”203 which must amount to “a 
substantial privacy interest”204 (i.e., more than de 
minimis). Thus, if a court finds that the withheld 
materials do not possess identifying information, 
Exemption 6 will not apply. For example, if a 
FOIA requester seeking certain agency perfor-
mance reviews makes clear that the requester is 
“not seeking personal identifiers of any of the 
records and anticipate[s] that [the agency] will 
redact these identifiers,” a court could find that 
Exemption 6 does not apply given that the re-
dacted performance reviews themselves do not 
identify anyone.205 In addition, courts have required 
agencies to disclose materials if the person had 
somehow provided the personal information in 
a manner that did not evince an expectation of 
privacy. For example, in one such case, where an 
agency possessed statements provided by a person 
“on the record” to a reporter, the court found 
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that a person would have no privacy expectation 
in such statements.206 In another example, a court 
determined that Guantanamo Bay detainees did 
not have a privacy interest in statements made in 
a nonpublic legal proceeding because they lacked 
an expectation of privacy given that they were 
not explicitly told that the proceedings would 
be confidential.207 
 Other situations are not as clear cut for the 
Government attorney. For example, courts have 
differed on protecting the identity of people pe-
titioning the Government to take certain action, 
with some courts finding a lack of a privacy interest 
in their identity,208 while others have found that 
Exemption 6 applies to such information.209 In 
addition, although many courts have found that 
“the privacy interest of an individual in avoiding 
the unlimited disclosure of his or her name and 
address is significant,”210 a few have found only a 
minimal privacy interest in such information.211
 Should the agency identify a “substantial privacy 
interest,” the courts determine whether revealing 
that information “would constitute a clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy” by balancing 
the privacy interest in the withheld information 
against the public interest in disclosure. The 
“public interest” inquiry must focus on the core 
purpose of FOIA—“to shed light on an agency’s 
performance.”212 Thus, if the information does 
not reveal anything about agency conduct, any 
non-de minimis privacy interest, however small, 
will justify the withholding of the materials under 
Exemption 6.213 In addition, a court is not likely 
to order the disclosure of information with only 
an “attenuated” public interest in the release of 
the materials, as seen with the courts’ recurring 
protection for names and addresses of individuals 
where the only possible public interest would be 
to allow the requester to interview those people 
about possible Government misconduct.214 
 In light of the difficulty predicting the existence 
of a privacy interest and the fact-based nature of 
the balancing test, Government attorneys should 
be aware that their agencies may be required 
to reveal private information that the attorneys 
possess. Courts do routinely protect some types 
of personal data under Exemption 6, and so 
there is typically little doubt that Exemption 6 
protects a person’s social security number, birth 
date, family status, religious affiliation, and other 
purely personal information that sheds little light 
on agency conduct. However, for other materi-
als containing personal information, including 
the inclusion of person’s name and address in a 
document, Government attorneys should consult 
with their designated FOIA official regarding a 
potential requirement to disclose such information 
to a requester. Given that some agencies routinely 
receive the same requests for certain personal 
information, the official may have some specific 
guidance—supported by case law—regarding the 
information at issue.
 Finally, for personal information obtained as part 
of a law enforcement investigation, Exemption 7(C) 
provides stronger, and in some cases, categorical, 
protection from FOIA disclosure. This exemption 
looks to whether disclosure of records or informa-
tion compiled for law enforcement purposes “could 
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy,”215 a standard that has 
allowed courts to more broadly protect private infor-
mation in law enforcement records when balancing 
against the public interest in disclosure. Thus, this 
sort of information is likely to be protected from 
FOIA, meaning that Government attorneys need 
not pay the same level of concern to the potential 
disclosure faced by all other private information 
described above in connection with Exemption 6.
 ■ Whistleblower Protection Act
 In addition to the required disclosure that agen-
cies must make under FOIA, federal law encour-
ages certain Government employees, including 
many Government attorneys, to disclose certain 
information that reveals Government wrongdoing 
through the aptly named Whistleblower Protec-
tion Act.216 This act does not provide a mechanism 
for blowing the whistle or even provide federal 
employees with guidance on how to do so. 
 Rather, the WPA protects certain federal employ-
ees—after the fact—by prohibiting their managers 
from taking or failing to take a “personnel action” 
(or threatening such action) as a result of a whistle-
blowing disclosure.217 The WPA defines “personnel 
action” as, for example, including an appointment, 
a promotion, a disciplinary or corrective action, 
a detail, transfer, or reassignment, a decision 
concerning pay, benefits, awards, or education or 
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training, or any other significant change in duties, 
responsibilities, or working conditions.218 Thus, the 
WPA prevents retaliatory personnel actions against 
certain federal employees who reveal evidence of 
illegal or improper Government activity.219 While, at 
first glance, the WPA appears straightforward, the 
language of the statute and interpretive case law 
make clear that the WPA’s provisions are restrictive 
and narrowly construed. 
 Specifically, there are significant exceptions 
to the WPA, some of which are described below, 
and Government attorneys should be aware of 
the limits to the WPA’s protection when con-
sidering whether to “blow the whistle.” The 
high profile case of Coleen Rowley provides 
an example. The former FBI attorney wrote a 
memorandum to then-FBI Director Robert Muel-
ler, which she also provided to two members of 
the Senate Committee on Intelligence, about 
what she described as her agency’s mishandling 
of 9/11 terrorist Zacarais Moussaoui. 220 At the 
end of her memorandum, she stated without 
elaboration that she “wish[ed] to take advan-
tage of the federal ‘Whistleblower Protection’ 
provisions” in making her remarks.221 However, 
“[a]t the time, she did not know exactly what 
[the Act] was—nor that the legislation offered 
FBI employees a weak shield.”222 Thus, before 
blowing the whistle, all Government attorneys 
should be clear about the extent that the WPA 
may protect them in light of where they work 
and the potential revelation.
 As a starting point, a Government attorney 
should determine whether his or her particular 
position is under the protective umbrella of the 
WPA. The protections broadly apply to those 
in “covered positions”—current, former, and 
even prospective executive employees in the 
competitive and the excepted service, as well as 
Senior Executive Service personnel.223 The WPA, 
however, carves out positions that are “excepted 
from the competitive service” because their “con-
fidential, policy-determining, policy-making, or 
policy-advocating character” are not eligible for 
the WPA’s protection.224 In addition, the Presi-
dent may specifically exclude positions from the 
WPA’s coverage.225 The WPA also excludes the 
employees of certain agencies, including the 
Government Accountability Office (a Legislative 
Branch agency) and many of the intelligence-
gathering agencies, such as the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, 
and the National Security Agency, in light of the 
classified or otherwise sensitive information in 
their possession.226 Many of these agencies have 
their own whistleblower statutes or otherwise 
provide protection similar to that afforded by 
the WPA.227
 Next, Government attorneys should determine if 
the disclosure itself would trigger the protections 
of the WPA. The subject matter of the disclosure 
must be information that the Government attorney 
“reasonably believes” is evidence of “a violation of 
any law, rule, or regulation…gross mismanagement, 
a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a 
substantial and specific danger to public health or 
safety.”228 Thus, the disclosure must be about a legal 
violation or a nontrivial mismanagement, waste, 
or threat to the public, such as the allegation in 
Coons v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, in which the whistleblower alleged that 
the IRS processed a large, fraudulent refund for 
a wealthy taxpayer.229 As explained in the WPA’s 
legislative history, the act is “a means to protect 
the Pentagon employee who discloses billions of 
dollars in cost overruns, the [General Services Ad-
ministration] employee who discloses widespread 
fraud, and the nuclear engineer who questions 
the safety of certain nuclear plants.”230 The WPA 
does not cover mere “disagreement” over policy 
choices231 or “arguably minor and inadvertent 
miscues occurring in the conscientious carrying 
out of one’s assigned duties.”232 
 In addition, an attorney may not be protected 
if the disclosure of information is expressly pro-
hibited by law or by Executive Order.233 If such a 
disclosure is prohibited by law or Executive Order, 
then the protections only apply if the disclosure 
is made to the OSC or to an agency’s Inspector 
General or designated recipient of such disclo-
sures.234 Consequently, under most circumstances, 
if such a disclosure is made to another individual 
or organization, the protections are unlikely to 
be available to the attorney. Thus, a Government 
attorney who wants to disclose information with 
the expectation of whistleblower protection to the 
media, for example, should first determine whether 
the disclosure would otherwise violate the law.235
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GUIDELINES
 Government attorneys who believe that they 
need the protection of the WPA have a num-
ber of options. Depending on their particular 
circumstances, they may seek redress in one 
of several different forums, including, seeking 
an individual right of action before the MSPB, 
pursuing corrective action from the OSC, or by 
filing a grievance under their agency’s negotiated 
grievance procedures.236 
 While the WPA encourages Government at-
torneys to reveal certain information about their 
clients, attorneys should fully understand the 
protections available to them before actually 
blowing the whistle. Thus, as other areas of the 
law discussed in this BRIEFING PAPER, attorneys are 
encouraged to seek the advice of an agency ethics 
official or a representative from the Whistleblow-
ing unit of the OSC before taking further action. 
   These Guidelines are intended to assist you in 
understanding the ethical standards to which 
Government attorneys must adhere in conducting 
Government business. They are not, however, a 
substitute for professional representation in any 
specific situation.
 1. Government attorneys should be cautious 
when offered an item from a person doing busi-
ness before the attorney’s employing agency. 
Although there are numerous exceptions to the 
rule prohibiting gifts from these individuals, 
there is fine line between acceptable items and 
those that violate the law. 
 2. If an attorney is prohibited from directly 
accepting a gift, indirect receipt through an 
intermediary (such as a spouse or minor child) 
is also prohibited.
 3. Government attorneys must be cautious 
before using Government property or spending 
official time on a personal matter. While many 
agencies allow de minimis use, the exception is 
narrowly construed. 
 4. Government attorneys must be very care-
ful before discussing prospective employment 
opportunities with persons doing business with 
the attorney’s employing agency. It is always ad-
visable to consult with an agency ethics official 
to determine whether disqualification from a 
particular matter is necessary. 
 5. Government attorneys should avoid engag-
ing in activities or taking an action that raises 
concerns regarding an appearance of the loss of 
impartiality. Although the activity or action may 
not be expressly prohibited under the law, if it 
merely “looks bad,” the activity or action should 
be avoided. 
 6. Government attorneys generally have a 
duty of confidentiality to their client agencies, 
as defined and regulated by their specific state 
bar rules.
 7. Government attorneys should be aware that 
the Freedom of Information Act allows members 
of the general public to request any documents 
from the attorneys’ agency, unless a specific FOIA 
exemption applies to the document in question 
that exempts it from disclosure.
 8. Government attorneys should remember 
that even exempt materials might end up in the 
hands of the public should the agency’s FOIA 
official choose to release them. In addition, if a 
requested document is exempt from FOIA dis-
closure but has segregable portions that are not 
exempt, those portions must be released to the 
requester.
 9. Government attorneys who possess or 
seek confidential business information should 
be aware that FOIA’s Exemption 4 specifically 
exempts from disclosure trade secrets and com-
mercial or financial information obtained from 
a person that are privileged or confidential.
 10. Government attorneys should keep in mind 
that FOIA Exemption 5 exempts from disclo-
sure certain internal privileged attorney-client 
communications and attorney work product, as 
well as any predecisional deliberative materials, 
but that sharing such materials outside of the 
Executive Branch family could cause Exemption 
5 to no longer apply to otherwise exempted 
materials.
 11. Government attorneys should be aware that 
FOIA Exemption 6 also exempts from disclosure 
certain private personal information, but that 
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private information that bears on the agency’s 
conduct could trigger its disclosure. 
 12. The Whistleblower Protection Act only 
provides certain Government attorneys with 
after-the-fact protection against retaliatory per-
sonnel actions, and these protections apply to 
only certain disclosures. Government attorneys 
should consult with their agencies’ Inspector 
General or with the Office of Special Counsel 
to determine whether their positions qualify for 
the WPA’s protection. 
 13. Government attorneys are only protected 
under the WPA if disclosure involves informa-
tion that the employee “reasonably believes” 
is evidence of a legal violation or a nontrivial 
mismanagement, waste, or threat to the public.
 1/ The term “classified” here is used to describe 
all sensitive government materials—from 
“Top Secret” documents to those deemed 
to be “Confidential.” See Exec. Order 
No. 13526, “Classified National Security 
Information,” 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 
2009); 6 C.F.R. § 7.21 .
 2/ 5 U.S.C.A. § 552.
 3/ 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302.
 4/ 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(a); Office of Government 
Ethics, Do it Right: An Ethics Handbook 
for Executive Branch Employees 7 (Jan. 
1995), available at http://www.usoge.
gov/training/training_materials/booklets/
bkdoitright_95.pdf. 
 5/ Exec. Order No. 12674, “Principles of Ethical 
Conduct for Government Officers and 
Employees,” 54 Fed. Reg. 15159 (1989), 
as modified by Executive Order 12731, 
55 Fed. Reg. 42547 (1990). 
 6/ 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b). 
 7/ See Office of Government Ethics, “Gen-
eral Principles,” http://www.usoge.gov/ 
common_e th i cs_ i ssues /gene ra l_ 
principles.aspx. 
 8/ See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 201, 203, 205, 208, 209. 
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 20/ “Market value” is defined as “the retail cost 
the employee would incur to purchase the 
gift. An employee who cannot ascertain 
the market value of a gift may estimate 
its market value by reference to the retail 
cost of similar items of like quality. The 
market value of a gift of a ticket entitling 
the holder to food, refreshments, en-
tertainment, or any other benefit shall 
be the face value of the ticket.” 5 C.F.R. 
§ 2635.203(c).
 21/ 5 C.F.R. § 2635.202(b). 
 22/ 5 C.F.R. § 2635.203(d). 
 23/ Dep’t of Justice Office of Inspector General, 
Report of Investigation Relating to J. 
Robert Flores, Former Administrator of 
OJJDP (Redacted for Public Release) 4, 
15–16 (Apr. 27, 2009), available at http://
www.justice.gov/oig/reports/OJP/index.
htm; Dep’t of Justice Office of Inspector 
General Audit Division, “Procedures 
Used by the Office of Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention To Award 
Discretionary Grants in Fiscal Year 2007,” 
Audit Report 09-24, at xvii n.13, 46 (Apr. 
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/
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